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The Unfree Space of Play: Emergence and
Control in the Video Game and the Platform
Digital technologies have radically altered modes of cultural, economic,
and social production while also blurring the lines between them. A deluge
of terms has crashed over different discursive spheres in an attempt to pin
down this historical moment: late capitalism, postmodernism, network
society, the society of control, platform capitalism, ludocapitalism or, more
succinctly, Empire as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) use the
term, a totalizing global order. The different valences and specificities
undergirding these terms keep them somewhat separate - they are not
perfect synonyms for one another—but they all share certain similarities.
They all acknowledge the rise of a new form of capitalist production or
reproduction—a sea-change in the technologies that allow people and
groups to communicate, a tendency toward more decentralized,
rhizomatic forms of control, a move away from monolithic hierarchical
arrangements, so on and so on.
We have moved past the industrial era dominated by the
Foucauldian mechanisms of discipline, of which the enclosed and
separate spaces of the factory and the school are paradigmatic, into a
strange new world characterized by “ultrarapid forms of free-floating
control” (Deleuze 2009, p. 90). The enclosure has become a mold, a
modulation. The rigid definition in time and space has been exploded
leaving the inside/outside dichotomy, alongside the mass/individual and
now/later pairs, deeply troubled. Now one never leaves the site of
production as long as one has access to e-mail and teleconferencing, one
never “finishes” school, one never exists in the here and now but rather “a
sort of endless digital Now” (Gibson 2012, p. 44) always with one foot in
the near future. The factory itself gives way to the corporate platform,
“generative mechanisms, engines that set the terms of participation
according to fixed protocols” (Bratton 2015, p. 374), platforms like Google,
Facebook, Uber, YouTube, etc which connect us and define our actions.
The breakdown of those dichotomies which felt so naturally suited to
cause-and-effect, binary thought has led to an age governed by paradox,
with perhaps one central one: in the society of control, in which those
fortunate enough to have ready access to the internet can choose from all
its treasures, an endless cornucopia of choice, how are we subject to
more control than ever? We should look to videogames – the medium of
this century—and the platform, this century's factory—and to the ways that
they facilitate and restrict; in short how they modulate. It is one thing to
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recognize that “in societies of control there is both an increase in
openness and an increase in control” (Galloway and Thacker 2007, p. 73).
It is another to recognize that this paradox extends and broadens into a
designing for, and embracing of, the unexpected, the contingent.
This essay aims to shed some light on the way that platforms and
games have begun merging and how their dependence upon emergent
behaviors situates them within the society of control. The videogame and
the platform offer us the two halves of the logic of control. The videogame
shows us how algorithmic affordances, which “fetishize control” (Galloway
2006, p. 93) generate an illusion of choice useful for governing biopower.
The platform, the videogame's twin, reterritorializes rhizomatic space
allowing for a new centralization in a rhizomatic world—terms and
concepts which will be elucidated below. Their growing together is as
inevitable as it is ominous.
Let us begin by looking at the current state of videogames, the
valorization of emergence currently prevalent in the industry, and the ways
in which the aesthetics of emergence overlap with the functioning of
platforms.

Games
The great paradox of the game is that it is fundamentally defined by rules
and limitations, yet is experienced as a release from the constraints of life
and the world. Eric Zimmerman (2004): “play exists both because of and
despite the more rigid structures of a system” (p. 159). The complex
behaviors and peculiar individuality of each play session arise from this
simple contradiction. A player's distinctive play style in a game like chess
cannot transcend the rules of chess, but is an expression of his or her
individual talents and understanding of the game within the game.
Likewise, no two games of a sport like basketball are ever truly identical.
The players cannot 'break' the rules, but within the heavily constrained
time and space of a game of basketball there is a nearly infinite (sub)set of
possible actions which ensures the uniqueness of character of a player
and of any single game, all of which is only meaningful as a result of the
game's rules. All of those unique characteristics that arise during play and
which are the evidence of a well-crafted system–yet which are impossible
for the game's designer to anticipate—are called emergent. Designers
refer to unexpected actions that are technically allowable by the game's
strictures emergent behaviors. The unscripted stories that people form in
the field of play, the close scrapes, near misses, and last-minute underdog
victories, are called emergent narratives. Games – most analogue games
and more and more videogames – which privilege a degree of behavioral
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openness over tightly delimited, largely linear progress (Juul 2005, p. 76)
are, then, called emergent games.
Preoccupation with emergence in games represents a particular
design philosophy which privileges mechanical complexity over some of
the more conventional selling points of games – graphical fidelity, narrative
immersion, character design – in order to maximize the quality which is
exclusive to the medium. It is a thoroughly algorithmic approach to design
deeply rooted in the medium essentialism of the early ludologists, scholars
of the early-to-mid 2000's like Jesper Juul and Espen Aarseth who
understood games as sets of rules and algorithms first and foremost. The
purpose of the game viewed from the perspective of rules and algorithms
rather than narrative necessitates a change in thought. Viewed from a
cinematic perspective—one of the ludologists' most hated sins—games
which are narratively and visually rich supported by limited interactivity in
the vein of Don Bluth's Dragon's Lair, are successful. But from the
algorithmic, ludological perspective these games represent spectacular
failures. Rather, the narrative complexity should emerge from the rules
themselves. Zimmerman's perfect example is Ms. Pac-Man, “a narrative in
which procedures, relationships, and complex systems dynamically signify.
It is the kind of narrative that only a game could tell” (p. 162). The story is
a story of the player and the player's experience, which must differ from
the experiences of others in a meaningful way.
While a full history of emergence in games is well outside the
bounds of this essay, suffice it to say that the design strategies aimed at
maximizing emergent experiences and their associated genres change
with consumer taste, fads, and simple, raw processing power. In the
1990's the ascendant mechanics-heavy genres were fighting games and
complex immersive sims—i.e. systems-heavy simulations of fantastic
environments). In the 2000s, the popularity of games like Everquest and
Runescape paved the way for the explosive popularity of Blizzard's World
of Warcraft as the endless novelty of the MMORPG captured people's
social imagination. But the highest profile and most enduring games in the
last several years have been highly competitive, frequently updated
multiplayer games like League of Legends, Dota 2, and Overwatch. The
finer points of their play vary wildly: League and Dota 2 throw players into
a top-down, real-time-strategy style map while Overwatch is what is
typically called a “hero shooter,” a game in which players run and gun
through the enemy team in first-person to try and fulfill different game
modes’ objectives. Despite their ludological differences, all three fit nicely
into the gaming industry's current craze: games as a service (Schreier
2017), an economic model that aims to prolong the life—and profitability—
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of a game indefinitely. Games as a service is the attempt by developers
and producers to recast individual games as platforms of networked
activities and communications that do not end. These games thrive on
emergence. Their designers work to maintain a constant flux in character
strength and the viability of particular play styles in order to keep players
away from dominant strategies. To excel, players must not only play
constantly to remain familiar with the nuance of the game throughout
these changes but must also work on the game outside of its bounds,
through sites like mobafire.com and leaguecraft.com, to study up on
character strengths, item optimization, team synergies, tactics, and so
forth.
Minecraft is the second-best selling game of all time—after the
venerable Tetris—and it could not be more different from e-sports darlings
like Overwatch and League of Legends. The premise is simple: the game
offers a nigh-endless expanse of terrain of various types that the player
can mine for materials in order to then build whatever his or her heart
desires out of blocks. Players build massive structures in this game with
no extrinsic motivation; they build full scale replicas of Game of Thrones'
Westeros simply to have done so (Domanico 2015). There is very little
hard-coded competition in Minecraft. The game sports survival and story
modes, but the game's true selling-point is its free-play mode, in which
players roam a voxelated, nigh-infinite realm with the aim to build things.
Minecraft is the emergent game par excellence; developer Mojang has
created a game world that allows players free reign to express
themselves, while the networked connectivity of the game – the key to its
success (Isbister 2016, p. 43) – ensures that the prospect of displaying
one’s creation to other players offers a soft, social goal that structures
player behavior. Minecraft is only emergence. The endlessly
reconfigurable sandbox it provides to players only has as much meaning
as players express through it. It cannot be beaten or finished—one player
spent years documenting his attempt to simply reach the edge of the
game's map in a series of over 600 videos; as of 2018 he has not even
come close (Kurtjmac 2018).
Jean Baudrillard (2003) has written that “the end is also the finality
or purpose of something, that which gives it meaning. And when you are in
processes developing in a chain reaction, which, beyond a certain critical
mass, become exponential, they no longer have any finality or meaning …
we are already in an exponential, unlimited form in which everything
develops in the void, to infinity, without any possibility of reapprehending it”
(pp. 59-61). The endlessness of emergent games satisfies the platform's
need for insatiable growth as well as becoming an expression of it, always
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reconfiguring and re-actualizing without collapsing into finality. There is no
end, no inside and outside to the modern videogame. They are not the
virtual worlds that critics, scholars, and futurists envisioned in the aughts—
though they took notes from earlier MMO’s—but rather full-blown APIenabled platforms through which people can play the games, purchase
virtual commodities, chat, and strategize unconstrained by the bounds of
the magic circle. Games join all the other aspects of postmodern society
that proliferate endlessly into the void. Like the modern state of crisis
(Hardt and Negri 2000) in which states rule through perpetual exception to
the norm via ostensibly temporary measures epitomized by the PATRIOT
Act; like warfare, which becomes “banal” (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter
2009) and devolves into continuous police action without specific goals;
like narratives and franchises (Ndalianis 2004) which endure in theaters
and on screens indefinitely, videogames have no ending, placing them
formally and firmly in line with these other phenomena.
Yet games have always been without end. One cannot complete
football nor finish cricket. Even Ms. Pac-Man, Zimmerman's alreadyancient example, was conceived of by a small company called General
Computer as an update board referred to as an “enhancement kit” to
make Pac-Man less soluble after fans found dominant strategies—i.e.
universally ideal strategies—to maximize scores in the original game (Kent
2001, pp. 167-173). Games and their dynamic narratives have always
derived their lasting strength from their emergent properties. Whence the
difference, whence the platforming of games? The difference now is that
games are interconnected with vast extractive apparatuses which analyze
the emergent gap between rules and freedom, record the myriad
executions of player actions, and then double as pipelines for modification
by pushing through updates in real-time. Games' emergent properties
reflect back on the rules and algorithms themselves. The ontology of the
game is in perpetual flux, shaped by the fluid and myriad actualizations of
their complex rules, wearing away any imperfect edges in the system.
The videogame should be understood as very much like and yet
very much unlike other franchise entertainment, which depends upon
rampant serialization—think Marvel or Star Wars – really any Disney
property—to ensure a steady stream of profits to the studio. On the one
hand, videogames also exist primarily as commodities, objects to be
bought and sold in order to generate revenue, no different from any other
commodity to be melted down into the universal medium of capital. All the
tactics implemented by manipulative triple-A studios ultimately feed back
into the one central pursuit of profit. But on the other, videogames also
break past even the reproductive logic of film and television. New
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installments of a successful Marvel franchise may come out regularly as
creatives generate ever-more-sprawling hyperdiegetic worlds that can
conceivably house an infinite number of distinct stories, but only
videogames can truly be said to impel user-players to occupy the space—
except perhaps platforms, which I will address shortly—and pursue goals
dictated therein. The control of the videogame should also be understood
as radically different from the analog game. What separates the
videogame from the game, and the society of control from the disciplinary
society, is the radical difference between algorithmic affordance and rule.
The affordance offers a brand new way to interact with a virtual world, a
game, other people, etc. The rule, meanwhile, is a sociolinguistically-fixed
limitation that is only ever a pact between players. There is nothing
physically stopping a bored child playing Monopoly from moving his or her
piece wherever they want; only other players can do that, typically to the
displeasure of the offending child. In the digital game, affordances are
usually hard-coded into the system itself. They are perceived as liberating
rather than restricting, even if they amount to the same restraint as
traditional rulesets.
Platforms, as we shall see below, are fundamentally devices which
feed off of the behaviors which emerge from their affordances by
quantifying and storing vast amounts of behavioral data. They facilitate
behaviors to their own gain. The game as a medium has typically only
been interested in how it is played in order to further improve the
gameplay experience. It directs much more explicitly by allocating
intention through the “valorization of outcome” (Juul 2005, p. 36), but
nobody much minded as long as games remained in their own magic
circle of triviality. A major component of the platforming of the videogame
comes with the adoption of data-focused techniques most often
associated with platforms. Game designers have always looked to
professional testers and focus groups to analyze the efficacy of play in a
game, but the analytical capabilities of modern game platforms allow for a
qualitatively new level of control.
Not only do individual games increasingly resemble platforms in
their breadth and indeterminability, but gaming itself is increasingly
invested in individual platforms which read and type player 'dividuals.'
Stuart Brown (2010), for instance, has offered up eight player types:
artist/creator, collector, competitor, director, explorer, kinesthete,
storyteller, and joker (p. 65). Steam, a game distribution and play platform
which commands somewhere between 50% to 70% of all PC game
downloads (Grubb 2017), is the prime example. Steam's analytics can
measure a player's libraries, play history, interpersonal chat interaction,
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etc while the client also links to Google Analytics to track pages visited inclient. Game consoles, long considered platforms, have also been
mutating into connected platforms. The Playstation 4 has a 'share button'
which allows players to blend their gameplay with Facebook, Twitch, and
others with a single press. And of course players are most likely to share
unexpected moments that others will not necessarily see in their own
games. Emergence strikes again.
These games and their systems are always, finally, a means to
profit. They encourage emergent behavior in order to remain relevant. This
works both ways. Through distribution platforms like Steam or proprietary
systems companies make for their own games–the League of Legends
client, Ubisoft's Uplay—they become platforms that can and do measure
and store all manner of player behaviors. This helps the endless cycle of
patching keep games from being solvable—which is both an aesthetic
virtue for the game and an economic virtue for the owner-rentier—while
analytics provide not only behavioral but economic control by “[opening]
the gates to new monetization opportunities, either through targeted
advertising or, more frequently in the past few years, by allowing game
developers to deduce when the most appropriate moment to suggest a
micro-transaction within the game” (Freire et. al. 2016, p. 11). More
aleatory practices on the part of developers through “random drops” and
“loot boxes”—reward systems which grant players random in-game items
based on the quantity and quality of their play—can be so effectively
crafted to manipulate players that some regions are working to ban the
practice (Shah 2017). The platforming of games is the converting of play
into Hardt and Negri’s biopower (2000), “in which the economic, the
political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another” (p.
xiii) and establish a much tighter regime of social control, or what DyerWitheford and De Peuter (2009) have termed biopower play which, like
actual biopower, is still governed to the same end: perpetual accumulation
of capital, of data, and of attention which are themselves increasingly
indistinguishable from one another.

Platforms
Not too long ago critics and designers used the term platform in order to
describe largely physical devices: “specific hardware and software
combinations, like a particular game console or mobile device with its own
operating system, hardwired (inscribed and coded) chips, and input
technologies (keypad, game controller, accelerometer) system, a number
of formats, each with their own affordances and constraints” (Murray 2012,
p. 34). The old notion of a platform has not left us yet – MIT Press's
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Platform Studies series still addresses the intersection of hardware with
software design, and it serves us well to remember that no digital object
exists outside a material base. But the conventional definition has been
slowly supplanted in the past decade or so with the intensification of
networking. The platform we know now is an altogether more abstract
structure. Platforms today ultimately mediate everything – the social
(Twitter, Facebook), the commercial (Amazon), the logistical (Google), the
cultural (all of the above) – without the tangible constraints of apparent
hardware specificity, with one of their few shared qualities being
abstraction itself. The old hardware/software paradigm of platform
definition conceived of the platform as an engine for virtualization, a
machine which sustains, presents, and represents the virtual. The modern
platform is, instead, itself virtual and only dubiously locatable. Benjamin
Bratton's (2015) slightly more contemporary definition is appropriately
involved: “a standards-based technical-economic system that
simultaneously distributes interfaces through their remote coordination
and centralizes their integrated control through that same coordination” (p.
42). Nick Srnicek's (2017) definition, though simpler, is no less abstract:
“At the most general level platforms are digital infrastructures that enable
two or more groups to interact” (p. 43). He acknowledges non-digital
platforms while arguing that their inefficiency renders them less than ideal
in the current economic landscape (p. 134).
This definitional change speaks to a rampant virtualization, a deactualizing of economic and social centers into Deleuze's “ultra-rapid
forms of free-floating control” (p. 90). The rigid material structures and
institutions of the disciplinary society which govern by impressing
ideological discipline onto political subjects through the strength of the
system's walls and its subsequent contextualization evaporate into the
networks. The physical bounds of the school, the barracks, the prison, the
company disappear into algorithmic codes, and each become a “freefloating” context capable of being realized anywhere. The school extends
indefinitely throughout one's life, beginning with the social obligation
toward higher education and continuing with endless seminars, retreats,
and re-training events even as e-mail and online classes transport the
walls of the school to one's living room or a nearby coffee shop. The
corporation exists not as a single building, but as a constantly renewed
coalition of semi-autonomous agents, some housed inside company
buildings tethered to one another only by fiber-optic cable while others
exist in a limbo of precarity as contractors telecommuting from home and
accessing the data necessary to perform their functions remotely. This
hypothetical company is in perpetual need of actualization and re-
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actualization. Pierre Levy (1998) provides a lucid explanation: “the
virtualization of the corporation consists primarily of transforming the
spatiotemporal coordinates of work into a continuously renewed problem
rather than a stable solution. The organizations center of gravity is no
longer a group of buildings, workstations, and schedules, but a process of
coordination” (p. 26-27). Look to the great titans of postmodern American
industry: Google, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, all companies whose
products are platforms and which are themselves dependent upon
platformed communication to sustain their trans-national bulk. In other
words, all perfectly indicative of the global capitalist enterprise. Even the
conventional industrial powers depend heavily on either subscriptions to
industrial platforms or on proprietary platforms of their own in order to best
coordinate and streamline the production process to shave the least
fraction of a cent off each unit's cost (Srnicek 2017) via a kind of virtual
Toyotism. The platform has supplanted the factory, if obliquely, as the
essential form and symbol of economic power. It is the engine which
virtualizes the walls of the factory so that they might be re-laid elsewhere
at any time.
This is where the concept of the rhizome and the process of
deterritorialization and reterritorialization become key to explaining and
understanding this centralization. The rhizome is a radically flattened, nonhierarchical structure wherein each point is capable of connecting to any
other without resorting to mediation or a central power. As such, it
represents what the early techno-utopian internet would and could be, a
topic discussed ad nauseam elsewhere. Yet the rhizome, in Deleuze and
Guattari's (1987) usage, also forms the map of the interrelationships that
occur within the individual, between individuals, between groups, between
concepts, individuals, assemblages, and so on. “The rhizome pertains to a
map that must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable,
connectable, reversible, modifiable” (p. 21), neither one nor many yet
both. And that map is “produced,” modified by the process of
deterritorialization, the escape of an individual, group, object, quality,
concept, etc. from its milieu into a new one—reterritorialization—or off into
its own plane—absolute deterritorialization.
Individual people, objects, even ideas and qualities deterritorialize
along what Deleuze and Guattari call “lines of flight,” the vectors along
which they leave their old contexts and functions to enter new ones. They
write that “a group or individual creates the line rather than following it” (p.
204), and in so doing form a new path in the rhizome rather than
necessarily retracing lines already pathed. In this context, we might
consider these paths to be reposting, hyperlinking, moving from one digital
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community to the next, spreading viral content, mutating memes, etc, all
the behaviors which define networked communication and activity. The
platform, then, serves as a central node in the rhizome according to its
connective capacities, encouraging deterritorialization along lines of flight
so that the platform can then absorb those lines into its own map, its own
diagram. This is what emergence means to the platform: allowing and
even designing for lines of flight that the extractive algorithms of the
platform can then reify as its own territory. The greater the platform's
capacity for reification, the greater its ability to provide individuals with a
pool of raw, virtual abstraction they might actualize. The more those
individuals actualize, the deeper the platform's pool, effecting a growing
centralization by what McKenzie Wark (2004) calls the vectoralist class
which “owns the means of realizing the value of these abstractions” (p.
21).
The platform thrives off of – indeed depends upon – the networking
of people. The vast apparatuses of interconnectivity that were envisioned
as liberating powers for the masses proved to merely require different
methods of monetization. The platform is precisely that which re-organizes
that control: “The undifferentiated mass that by its simple presence was
able to destroy the modern tradition … appears now as a powerful
productive force and an uncontrollable source of valorization” (Hardt and
Negri 2000, p. 376). All that was needed was a way to better insinuate loci
of power into the overly rhizomatic—from the perspective of capital and
power—early net. In the most direct sense it is a business/technical model
that requires that people participate in order to actualize the platform's
naturally inert potential; there can be no Uber without users participating in
the virtual system. This is the crude, forward facing half of the economic
model by which Facebook makes its money and satisfies its raison d'être
by generating ad revenue, Uber and Lyft provide a framework for ridesharing for which they pocket a percentage, while Amazon and Alibaba
offer networked storefronts for digital retail. None of these can operate
without the willing participation of an active user base. One could argue
that since every platform is an abstract formal model designed for
occupation by any and all that its most basic functions require an
emergent constituency, that the exact configuration of actualization is
understood from the start to be unknown. There is some truth to this, but
one might make the same argument of the factory.
The real dependence on emergence comes from the back-end
structure of the platform. Behind the scenes, every platform scrapes user
interactions for data in order to better suit the desires of users—often
unknown to the users themselves—to target advertising, to sell as
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resource to other firms, and to maintain control. Much like the game, the
platform must make sure to maintain a sense of fairness among users by
archiving every interaction to scour for abuses—one of the more
admirable uses of unprecedented surveillance, one suspects—and for
bugs or glitches to keep users siphoning through their digital choke points.
An aura of fairness and of the sense of algorithmic affordance mentioned
above insures that use will continue and that the major platforms become
thicker and thicker nodes in the rhizome, which leads to better and greater
quantities of data, thus improving services, and so on ad infinitum. Thus
the platform depends upon emergence in order to find new types of data
to extract and new changes to make in its perpetual slouching towards
monopolization (Srnicek 2017). Basically, platforms thrive off the play that
emerges from their formal structures, their affordances, and limits in much
the same way as the videogame. Zimmerman's (2004) definition of play as
“the free space of movement within a more rigid structure” which “exists
both because of and also despite the more rigid structures of a system” (p.
159) holds just as true of the platform as of the game. This can be fruitfully
conceived of in terms of intellectual profit: the platform must generate
more knowledge than was coded into it in order to monetize the free labor
of the general intellect.
Tizianna Terranova points out that the reality of the extractive
process of free labor is not so simple—one cannot measure intellectual,
creative, or affective contribution by the same simple, quantitative metrics
that managers bring to bear on labor-time—and that there remains a kind
of cultural accursed share to the gift economy of digital community that
resists co-option by capital. She points out that “Knowledge workers need
open organizational structures to produce, because the production of
knowledge is rooted in collaboration” (Terranova 2003) in a space
unimpeded by total extraction. Not every idea can or should be
commodified into a paid blog, or a web-series, etc. The genius of the
platform, like the game, then, is that it foregoes the traditional valorization
model in which the stories of the masses are shaped into saleable
products in the form of reality television and instead exploits the
centralizing tendencies of network effects to chart off the most valuable
social real estate and extracts value from simple presence there. In the
same way that Blizzard did not care if you used the virtual space of World
of Warcraft as a complicated chatroom rather than a game so long as you
paid your monthly fee, the platform creates the open spaces necessary for
communal labor and cleverly arrays it with algorithmic tools that
simultaneously facilitate those processes and measures their success.
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The four companies mentioned earlier, Google, Apple, Microsoft,
and YouTube, were all also participants in the National Security Agency's
domestic spying program PRISM thanks to the centralization they bring to
the web (Kaplan 2016). Control may increasingly depend upon economic
forces to manipulate, but traditional sovereign powers can also leverage
the re-centralizing effects of platforms toward their own ends. Yet it should
be alarming to note that governments – the US government in this
example, though any nation of the 5 Eyes and increasingly any nation at
all – appeal to the platforms rather than the other way around. The
platform's ability to encourage behaviors in order to capture them outstrips
the capabilities of traditional government apparatuses. As Bratton (2015)
points out, “platforms not only have geopolitical ramifications and
implications; they are a geopolitical condition and constitution in their own
right” (p. 122). So let it be known that while platforms can and do act as
sovereign surveillance prostheses, their role in the society of control runs
so much deeper than that. We see biopower at play once again: in the
platform one cannot readily distinguish between the social, the economic,
and the political.
But the platform needs to encourage use, to create vagaries in
order to foster emergent behaviors before it can harvest that data.
Compelling is generally out of the question. Thus platforms must, like most
power-centers in the society of control, impel users, and no form is better
suited to impelling, to channeling the desiring-machine, than the game.
Gamification, after all, is just valorization rebranded. Many have argued
that in the first years of the 21st century, this realization has fostered a kind
of world-wide gamification. Julian Dibbell (2006) called it ludocapitalism.
McKenzie Wark (2007) calls it gamespace: “Play is no longer counter to
work. Play becomes work; work becomes play. Play outside of work found
itself captured by the rise of the digital game … The utopian dream of
liberating play from the game, of a pure play beyond the game, merely
opened the way for the extension of gamespace into every aspect of
everyday life” (p. 16) Under ludocapitalism, everything is recast as a kind
of agonistic striving for victory, an unending cycle of self-betterment in the
interest of besting others. Perpetual training, perpetual connection with the
work environment (Lazzarato 1996), and perpetual quota-meeting have
become the norm in order to achieve victory in an exaggerated form of
capitalistic competition. With the ludic platform, we can add perpetual
social engagement to that list.
Many platforms leave this vague. Platform gamification must remain
relatively loose in setting objectives or they risk limiting the data by limiting
emergence. YouTube encourages and rewards the breaking of viewer and
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subscriber records, both through higher monetization deals and oddly
antiquated plaques to channels who manage to surpass certain arbitrary
viewer thresholds. Snapchat and Timehop maintain a crude kind of
scoring system that alerts users to their “streaks,” or how many days in a
row they have engaged with the platform, engaged with specific other
“friends,” etc. Grubhub, a food ordering platform, has distributed the usual
“customer reward” discounts in the form of spinners and minigames to add
a “lootbox” dimension to an otherwise mundane activity. Grubhub's (2015)
website exhorts others to do the same: “Everyone loves a good game.
Turn your loyalty program into a game and add an extra level of
entertainment to the customer experience. Consider using a badging or
ranking system. As customers rack up visits to your restaurant, they rise in
rank, and the higher they go, the better the rewards they receive.”
Gamification extends to less obvious platforms as well. Even the
more staid, less public facing industrial platform faces gamification in the
near future, as factory owners look for ways to wring out self-motivation
from employees. Simple industrial tasks like the repetitive tightening of
bolts can be gamified via a platform interface to encourage an
unconscious flow-state in the worker, leading to more orderly and regular
labor (Roh et. al 2016). This is not a particularly emergent practice, but
one we can expect to see more of in the near future.
With the success of Pokemon Go breaking functional AR into the
mainstream, we can also expect further use of platform enabled—as well
as bankrolled and designed—AR technology to cast the impelling logic of
the game-platform into real space. If one of gamification's great uses is
educational (Bogost 2010, p. 245) then the society of control can easily
use games to “educate” to its own ends—through a lucrative deal with one
of the tech giants, no doubt. One of the games first developed by
Pokemon Go developer Niantic while it was still attached to Google was
an AR game called Ingress, in which players on two opposing teams
compete with one another to tag landmarks and form “control fields.”
Bratton has pointed out that the “ludic demands of Ingress are to send
people out into their cities training them to see, attack, and defend against
the territorial incursions of enemies perceivable only through special
software-enabled perspectives” (p. 242). This is effectively a recasting of
earlier discourses surrounding joystick warfare (Penny 2004) and the
military-entertainment complex, but one whose persistence helps to
illuminate the lines running from platform-corporation to game to sovereign
body.
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Lessons
So then the governing logic of our time is the property of emergence. If
this is broadly true of network actions and especially true of platforms,
what can the study of games tell us about the functioning of platforms?
Firstly that we can reverse-engineer the design precepts governing
platforms through the lens of game design. The purpose of the platform
can be meaningfully concentrated to “continued use,” and the engaging
game is the one that players will play “again and again if something about
the experience continues to engage them with 'variety, novelty, and
surprise'” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, p. 165). Veteran games journalist
Leigh Alexander (2013), discussing the legendary Warren Spector's ideas
on emergence, offered that designers aim to “create global rules versus
specific, instanced behavior of objects and characters; build interlocking
systems that are predictable and consistent but not pre-determined.”
Game-platform convergence can expose the still-prevalent myth
that expression through platforms is largely free. Games' status as fictions
invites a cultural critique, and nobody would assert that what one does in
the broadest sandbox game like Skyrim is constrained only by the limits of
one's own imagination. Emergence is still a product of restraints, and
breaking Skyrim or Deus Ex is still an expression not of the player, really,
but of the system and its algorithms. What one does on Facebook, what
one says on Twitter, or what one uploads to YouTube my seem free—“I
can say whatever I want on here!”—but is still shaped by the affordances
coded into each platform, though recent debates over the limits of freedom
of speech have thrown this discrepancy into sharper relief. Game designer
Harvey Smith has argued for “systemic level design” which privileges
emergence because “it allows for more self-expression on the players'
part; the players can solve problems the way they want to solve them
rather than the way the game designers planned” (qtd. in Juul 2005, p.
77). But players are always still solving the same problem.
Emergence, the unplanned rising out of a deeply abstract system,
is always finally an expression of the platform from which it is birthed and
it returns to the platform as data. Whereas constant updates and patches
keep the modern game of emergence from ever being solvable, the data
tracking and accumulation technologies employed by platforms thrive off
of new and unexpected data streams. Bogost (2008) has argued that
emergent videogames “mark an important break in their rejections of
'natural' order, like the rejections [put forth by] Deleuze and Guattari” (p.
151). The emergent game allows for the radical reappraisal and
reconfiguration of the self through the degree and “type” of emergence
allowable by the system. For Bogost, the game of emergence allows for
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an applied schizoanalysis—as Deleuze and Guattari call their practice—in
that its low-level simplicity restores meaning to “free-form, localized
maneuvers” which rely “on individual gestures, not on coordinating system
operations” (p. 149). The central concern here is the perpetuation of
openness rather than the rigidity of closed systems of self-hood, identity,
etc. that potential latent in a network offers. Baldwin (2018) points out that
this is perhaps most salient in the liberatory potential that avatar-crafting
can offer trans players, both as a means for creating a space of selfhood
foreclosed by actual space and as a “free-form, localized maneuver” of
subversion against established gender constructs. But Bogost also warns
us of the potential pitfall, that the rhizome always threatens to become a
rigid structure itself, which dwarfs the individual connections and
contributions it contains. The map overwhelms the territory, so to speak.
The postmodern 'dividual,' in the game and on the platform is pre-defined
contingently and rapidly by the system, with the system the only true
message. The platform-game and the game-platform do dispense with the
naturalistic fallacy, but only to reimpose a new nature. A la Baudrillard
(2010), the emergent interaction of user and platform/game is “neither
information nor communication, but referendum, perpetual test, circular
response, verification of the code” (p. 75).
While the game helps us understand the way that platforms
manage biopower by manipulating behavior, the platform can help us
understand the consolidation of real power in the videogame.

Conclusion
The shift to designing for emergent behaviors in the game and the
platform is fundamentally the tacit recognition of a broader conceptual shift
in power relations under a capitalistic biopolitical regime. Biopolitical
organization radically redefines the relations between the state, other loci
of control, and the individual i.e. through the massification of the individual.
Where the disciplining of the individual was once sufficient to ensure, in
the perfect case, a compliant subject epitomized by the factory worker
who recognized and obeyed the edicts of power, the modern user-subject
unintentionally shapes power itself through his or her behavior. As
Alexander Galloway (2006) has noted, “[if] diverse technical systems are
flexible enough to accommodate massive contingency, then the result is a
more robust system that can subsume all comers under the larger mantle
of continuity and universalism” (p. 101). The key change that takes place
with networked power becomes the recognition of informatic control as a
far more potent tool. Foucault pointed out that the actions of individual
subjects “are phenomena that are aleatory and unpredictable when taken
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in themselves or individually, but which, at the collective level, display
constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish” (Foucault qtd. in
Galloway and Thacker 2007. p. 73). I argue that the next step past macroscale engagement with populations is the accounting for and successful
management of the unpredictable itself through the expectation for and
automatic capture of emergent behaviors.
All signs point toward a rapid intensification of this merging
between the logic of games with the maps of platforms. In February 2018,
Brice Morrison (2018), former lead designer of Zynga, a company known
for its mobile and Facebook games, penned a piece entitled “The Next
Surprise Billion Dollar Game Will Be On Alexa” in which he boldly
proclaims—in the first line no less—that “I'm predicting by 2020 there will
be a billion dollar game where the primary way to play is with your voice.”
Natural language play, the powerful AI necessary to make it work, and the
intense complexity of the saleable data that Amazon would inevitably
siphon off should give us pause. Since then, games have slowly and
surely made their way onto that platform: a Pac-Man game, game tie-ins
for Jurassic World as well as Westworld. While still a far cry from
Morrison's billion dollar hit or even from really functional games, they are
harbingers of things to come.
A little over a month after Morrison published his piece to
Gamasutra, the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke, and millions of
Americans were informed that their most trivial actions on Facebook had
yielded data that had played at least some part in the outcome of the 2016
election. A profile by Carole Cadwalladr (2018) for The Guardian of Chris
Wylie, the whistleblower who brought the scandal to light, offered more
immediately distressing information. Midway through the piece,
Cadwalladr relates a strange, almost humorous anecdote from an
unnamed member of Cambridge University's Psychometrics Center (which
produced papers of great influence on Wylie):
There was one [program] called You Are What You Like and it was
demonstrated to the intelligence services. And it showed these odd
patterns; that, for example, people who liked ‘I hate Israel’ on
Facebook also tended to like Nike shoes and KitKats. There are
agencies that fund research on behalf of the intelligence services.
And they were all over this research. That one was nicknamed
Operation KitKat.
This is the product of Facebook quizzes rather than games, but it is
only a matter of time until categories like Stuart Brown's are turned to the
same unpredictable ends.
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Ian Bogost (2018), in his response to the revelations, published a
piece in The Atlantic admitting to the world that a satirical game he had
made in 2010 had captured the Facebook data of anybody who played it,
simply because it was easier to accept the data than not. One month later,
Newzoo reported that mobile gaming had surpassed 50% of all game
sales across the globe (Wijman 2018) followed quickly by Bloomberg's
reporting on a new Google startup to focus on the development of mobile
games (Frier and Bergen 2018) which would require players to sign up
with their phone numbers. “Users create accounts with their phone
numbers, one of the people said. Google is considering it a social-media
investment because once a game gets to a certain size, it’s something of a
social network by itself.”
What most of this has led to is a renewed vigor among various
public and private spheres to campaign for privacy rights on the internet.
Privacy concerns in the vein of Cambridge Analytica and Bogost's Cow
Clicker are important, but what must be kept in mind at all times is that this
is only one small part, a symptom, of this formal consonance. In a sense,
even the economic abuses which cloud this new system are symptomatic
rather than essential. Rather, the overlapping of platforms and games into
a vast abstract, formal apparatus should be first and foremost considered
in its totality, as a totalizing force which, by its very virtuality, must be
thought in its abstraction first, and then on through its particular dangers.
In the execution of this essay, I have switched between these registers,
the general/formal and the particular, the molar and the molecular, in order
to offer an entrée into both aspects of what is doubtless a massively
complex virtual territory.
What can we do, then, to stem the tide? Deleuze (2009) counseled
that “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons”
(p. 90), but our arms are slow in coming. A return to self-contained forms
of expression and action would be regressive, merely an exchange of
today's problems for yesterday's. The problems of rigid structures and
arboreal models gave us the 'solutions' that now plague the society of
control. Current trends towards the reification of platforms through the
internet of things will continue to erode the division between the object and
the platform. Likewise, continuous pushes toward AR technology will
eventually yield fruit, and the thin membrane separating the game from life
will disintegrate.
Almaguer (2018) points to fan modding efforts as one way out of
the trap. By breaking a game down to its atomic elements and exerting
almost total control over a game world, the modder circumvents the
problem of emergence. In modding a world, the gravity of the game
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swings from the system to the player-modder, who has the capacity to
truly deterritorialize the game into something utterly different and which
welcomes further deterritorialization. These “tactical games” (DyerWitheford and De Peuter 2009) have the potential to break free by exiting
the emergent space. Yet as long as modding remains trapped in a
broader, extractive platform ecosystem like Steam the problems remain
the same; the tactical designer is absorbed and becomes a part of the
“playbor force” (Dyer-Witheford and De Peuter 2009) once again.
We might point to the platform cooperativism movement as the
platform analogue. The title of the volume assembled by Trebor Sholz and
Nathan Schneider (2017)—Ours to Hack and to Own—certainly points to a
shared hacker mentality between the movement and game modders. At its
simplest level, the platform cooperativism movement aims at breaking
down the the division between designer and user, vectoralist and subject,
that drives the platform's insidious extractive function. At its most extreme,
it represents a strategy for radically re-wiring the broader economic,
political, and cultural ecosystem in which platforms operate by providing a
viable alternative to the tech giants. Yet cooperativism is also plagued with
insufficiencies and pitfalls. First is simple viability. As Taylor (2017) points
out, “[history] abounds with rousing examples of cooperative projects, and
almost as many failure” (p. 234). More seriously, one must question
whether or not one can generate a truly equitable platform. One can pay
employees a fair wage, take every possible step to ensure the safety of
users' data, operate as transparently as possible, and still fail to achieve
one's ideals simply because a platform is a platform; it can only function
through extraction. Addressing concerns about privacy risks mistaking the
symptoms for the disease. A shared platform must still extract data and
segment the space of possibility.
Regardless, modding and cooperativism represent positive first
steps toward identifying genuine strategies for the battle ahead by striking
at the hidden rigidity of emergence. Only by pushing back on the myth of
emergence as a liberating aesthetic can we begin to chart a truly radical
space on in both games and platforms—or indeed whatever more
egalitarian model may supplant platforms. We need forms of play and
communication in which action does not generate an identical model, in
which all our behaviors are not trapped within their own sameness and
predictability. Certainly the potential for these technologies exist, it is
simply up to us to discover what they are. Whatever comes may be
stranger than we think.
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